Questões para Concursos

1 Since 1914 the structure of the world has changed. Compared to the present struggle between West and East, the rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sink 4 into insignificance. Today we are faced, not with a clash of interests, but with a fight between the desire on the one hand to defend individual liberties and the resolve on the other 7 hand to impose a mass religion. In the process the old standards, conventions and methods of international negotiation have been discredited. Had it not been for the 10 invention of the atomic bomb, we should already have been subjected to a third world war. Members of the Communist bloc today are 13 convinced that sooner or later they will acquire world dominion and will succeed in imposing their faith and their authority over the whole earth. They strain towards this 16 objective with religious intensity and are prepared to devote to its achievement their lives, their comfort and their prospects of happiness. Anything that furthers their purpose 19 is “right”; anything that obstructs it is “wrong”; conventional morality, even the creation of confidence, has no part in this scheme of things. Truth itself has lost its 22 significance. Compared to the shining truth of their gospel, all minor forms of veracity are merely bourgeois inhibitions. The old diplomacy was based upon the creation of 25 confidence, the acquisition of credit. The modern diplomat must realize that he can no longer rely on the old system of trust; he must accept the fact that his antagonists will not 28 hesitate to falsify facts and that they feel no shame if their duplicity be exposed. The old currency has been withdrawn from circulation; we are dealing in a new coinage. 31 This transformation of values has been aided by a new or “democratic” conception of international relations. In the old days the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted to a 34 small international élite who shared the same sort of background and who desired to preserve the same sort of world. Today the masses are expected to take an interest in 37 foreign affairs, to know the details of current controversies, to come to their own conclusions, and to render these conclusions effective through press and parliament. At the 40 same time, however, current issues have been rendered complex and interconnected; it is not possible to state issues, such as the Common Market, in short and simple terms. 43 Thus, whereas the man in the street is expected to have an opinion on international problems, the very complexity of these problems has rendered it difficult to provide him with 46 the information on which to base his judgment. Nicolson, H. (1963) (3rd edition) Diplomacy. Oxford: OUP, with adaptations.

1 Since 1914 the structure of the world has changed. Compared to the present struggle between West and East, the rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sink 4 into insignificance. Today we are faced, not with a clash of interests, but with a fight between the desire on the one hand to defend individual liberties and the resolve on the other 7 hand to impose a mass religion. In the process the old standards, conventions and methods of international negotiation have been discredited. Had it not been for the 10 invention of the atomic bomb, we should already have been subjected to a third world war. Members of the Communist bloc today are 13 convinced that sooner or later they will acquire world dominion and will succeed in imposing their faith and their authority over the whole earth. They strain towards this 16 objective with religious intensity and are prepared to devote to its achievement their lives, their comfort and their prospects of happiness. Anything that furthers their purpose 19 is “right”; anything that obstructs it is “wrong”; conventional morality, even the creation of confidence, has no part in this scheme of things. Truth itself has lost its 22 significance. Compared to the shining truth of their gospel, all minor forms of veracity are merely bourgeois inhibitions. The old diplomacy was based upon the creation of 25 confidence, the acquisition of credit. The modern diplomat must realize that he can no longer rely on the old system of trust; he must accept the fact that his antagonists will not 28 hesitate to falsify facts and that they feel no shame if their duplicity be exposed. The old currency has been withdrawn from circulation; we are dealing in a new coinage. 31 This transformation of values has been aided by a new or “democratic” conception of international relations. In the old days the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted to a 34 small international élite who shared the same sort of background and who desired to preserve the same sort of world. Today the masses are expected to take an interest in 37 foreign affairs, to know the details of current controversies, to come to their own conclusions, and to render these conclusions effective through press and parliament. At the 40 same time, however, current issues have been rendered complex and interconnected; it is not possible to state issues, such as the Common Market, in short and simple terms. 43 Thus, whereas the man in the street is expected to have an opinion on international problems, the very complexity of these problems has rendered it difficult to provide him with 46 the information on which to base his judgment. Nicolson, H. (1963) (3rd edition) Diplomacy. Oxford: OUP, with adaptations.

1 Since 1914 the structure of the world has changed. Compared to the present struggle between West and East, the rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sink 4 into insignificance. Today we are faced, not with a clash of interests, but with a fight between the desire on the one hand to defend individual liberties and the resolve on the other 7 hand to impose a mass religion. In the process the old standards, conventions and methods of international negotiation have been discredited. Had it not been for the 10 invention of the atomic bomb, we should already have been subjected to a third world war. Members of the Communist bloc today are 13 convinced that sooner or later they will acquire world dominion and will succeed in imposing their faith and their authority over the whole earth. They strain towards this 16 objective with religious intensity and are prepared to devote to its achievement their lives, their comfort and their prospects of happiness. Anything that furthers their purpose 19 is “right”; anything that obstructs it is “wrong”; conventional morality, even the creation of confidence, has no part in this scheme of things. Truth itself has lost its 22 significance. Compared to the shining truth of their gospel, all minor forms of veracity are merely bourgeois inhibitions. The old diplomacy was based upon the creation of 25 confidence, the acquisition of credit. The modern diplomat must realize that he can no longer rely on the old system of trust; he must accept the fact that his antagonists will not 28 hesitate to falsify facts and that they feel no shame if their duplicity be exposed. The old currency has been withdrawn from circulation; we are dealing in a new coinage. 31 This transformation of values has been aided by a new or “democratic” conception of international relations. In the old days the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted to a 34 small international élite who shared the same sort of background and who desired to preserve the same sort of world. Today the masses are expected to take an interest in 37 foreign affairs, to know the details of current controversies, to come to their own conclusions, and to render these conclusions effective through press and parliament. At the 40 same time, however, current issues have been rendered complex and interconnected; it is not possible to state issues, such as the Common Market, in short and simple terms. 43 Thus, whereas the man in the street is expected to have an opinion on international problems, the very complexity of these problems has rendered it difficult to provide him with 46 the information on which to base his judgment. Nicolson, H. (1963) (3rd edition) Diplomacy. Oxford: OUP, with adaptations.

Heatwaves are killing people 1 In recent days heatwaves have turned swathes of America and Europe into furnaces. Despite the accompanying blast of headlines, the implications of such 4 extreme heat are often overlooked or underplayed. Spectacular images of hurricanes or floods grab attention more readily, yet heatwaves can cause more deaths. Heat is 7 one of climate change’s deadliest manifestations. Sometimes its impact is unmistakable — a heatwave in Europe in 2003 is estimated to have claimed 70,000 lives. 10 More often, though, heatwaves are treated like the two in the Netherlands in 2018. In just over three weeks, around 300 more people died than would normally be expected at that 13 time of year. This was dismissed as a “minor rise” by officials. But had those people died in a flood, it would have been front-page news. 16 The havoc caused by extreme heat does not get the attention it merits for several reasons. The deaths tend to be more widely dispersed and do not involve the devastation of 19 property as do the ravages of wind and water. Moreover, deaths are not usually directly attributable to heatstroke. Soaring temperatures just turn pre-existing conditions such 22 as heart problems or lung disease lethal. Heatwaves will inevitably attract more attention as they become more frequent. As greenhouse gases continue to 25 accumulate in the atmosphere, not only will temperatures rise overall but extremes of heat will occur more frequently. Britain’s Met Office calculates that by the 2040s European 28 summers as hot as that of 2003 could be commonplace, regardless of how fast emissions are reduced. Urbanisation intensifies the risk to health: cities are hotter places than the 31 surrounding countryside, and more people are moving into them. The good news is that most fatalities are avoidable, if 34 three sets of measures are put in place. First, people must be made aware that extreme heat can kill and warning systems established. Heatwaves can be predicted with reasonable 37 accuracy, which means warnings can be given in advance advising people to stay indoors, seek cool areas and drink plenty of water. Smart use of social media can help. In 2017 40 a campaign on Facebook warning of the dangers of a heatwave in Dhaka, Bangladesh’s capital, reached 3.9m people, nearly half the city’s population. 43 Second, cool shaded areas and fresh water should be made available. In poor places, air-conditioned community centres and schools can be kept open permanently. In Cape 46 Town, spray parks have been installed to help people cool down. Third, new buildings must be designed to be resilient to the threat of extreme heat and existing ones adapted. 49 White walls, roofs or tarpaulins, and extra vegetation in cities, all of which help prevent heat from building up, can be provided fairly cheaply. A programme to install “cool 52 roofs” and insulation in Philadelphia reduced maximum indoor temperatures by 1.3 ?C. It is a cruel irony that, as with other effects of climate 55 change, the places that are hardest hit by heatwaves can least afford to adapt. In poor countries, where climates are often hotter and more humid, public-health systems are 58 weaker and preoccupied with other threats. Often, adaptation to extreme heat is done by charities if it is done at all. Particular attention should be paid to reaching both 61 remote areas and densely populated urban ones, including slums where small dwellings with tin roofs packed together worsen the danger that uncomfortably high temperatures 64 will become lethal. Adaptation is not an alternative to cutting emissions; both are necessary. But even if net emissions are reduced to 67 zero this century, the persistence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere means that heatwaves will continue to get worse for decades to come. As the mercury rises, governments in 70 rich and poor countries alike must do more to protect their populations from this very real and quietly deadly aspect of 72 climate change. Heatwaves are killing people. Available at: . Retrieved on: Aug. 22. 2019, with adaptations.

1 Since 1914 the structure of the world has changed. Compared to the present struggle between West and East, the rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sink 4 into insignificance. Today we are faced, not with a clash of interests, but with a fight between the desire on the one hand to defend individual liberties and the resolve on the other 7 hand to impose a mass religion. In the process the old standards, conventions and methods of international negotiation have been discredited. Had it not been for the 10 invention of the atomic bomb, we should already have been subjected to a third world war. Members of the Communist bloc today are 13 convinced that sooner or later they will acquire world dominion and will succeed in imposing their faith and their authority over the whole earth. They strain towards this 16 objective with religious intensity and are prepared to devote to its achievement their lives, their comfort and their prospects of happiness. Anything that furthers their purpose 19 is “right”; anything that obstructs it is “wrong”; conventional morality, even the creation of confidence, has no part in this scheme of things. Truth itself has lost its 22 significance. Compared to the shining truth of their gospel, all minor forms of veracity are merely bourgeois inhibitions. The old diplomacy was based upon the creation of 25 confidence, the acquisition of credit. The modern diplomat must realize that he can no longer rely on the old system of trust; he must accept the fact that his antagonists will not 28 hesitate to falsify facts and that they feel no shame if their duplicity be exposed. The old currency has been withdrawn from circulation; we are dealing in a new coinage. 31 This transformation of values has been aided by a new or “democratic” conception of international relations. In the old days the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted to a 34 small international élite who shared the same sort of background and who desired to preserve the same sort of world. Today the masses are expected to take an interest in 37 foreign affairs, to know the details of current controversies, to come to their own conclusions, and to render these conclusions effective through press and parliament. At the 40 same time, however, current issues have been rendered complex and interconnected; it is not possible to state issues, such as the Common Market, in short and simple terms. 43 Thus, whereas the man in the street is expected to have an opinion on international problems, the very complexity of these problems has rendered it difficult to provide him with 46 the information on which to base his judgment. Nicolson, H. (1963) (3rd edition) Diplomacy. Oxford: OUP, with adaptations.